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"MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE": CONTINUING
DISPARITY UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2D1.1
INTRODUCTION
The sentences for most federal narcotic offenses are governed by 21
U.S.C. § 8411 and section 2D1.12 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
[hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines]. Under these sections, the severity
of the sentence imposed directly relates to the amount (i.e., the weight)
of the controlled substance in question.3 However, the relevant weight
for sentencing purposes is not determined solely on the weight of the
drug in its pure form.4 According to Congress, the weight of any
"mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of a controlled
substance should be included in sentencing since narcotics are com-
monly cut, concealed or otherwise mixed with non-controlled sub-
stances.5 Although, at first glance, the phrase "mixture or substance
1. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Section 841(a) states:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally -
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distrib-
ute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counter-
feit substance.
Id. Section 841(b) outlines the penalty to be administered according to the type of con-
trolled substance and the quantity of the substance at issue. For example, if a violation of
subsection (a) involves:
5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of... cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of iso-
mers.., such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may
not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injuty re-
sults from the use of such substance shall be not less than 20 years or more than
life, a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the
provisions of Title 18, or $4,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or
$10,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, or both.
Id.
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COmm'N GUIDELINES MANUAL §2DII, (Nov.
1994), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4. [hereinafter sections of the Manual will be pre-
ceded by U.S.S.G.]. Section 2D1.1(c) sets forth a drug quantity table that assigns offense
levels based on the quantity and type of the drug involved. See U.S.S.G. § 2DLI (c)
3. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l(c).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(i).
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containing a detectable amount" appears to be unambiguous, the federal
circuit courts have struggled in determining the definition of a mixture
or substance when calculating a defendant's sentence. Due to differences
in interpretation, a defendant convicted in one circuit may receive a far
less severe sentence than another defendant, who, due to his own mis-
fortune, was convicted of the same crime in another circuit.6 First, this
Comment targets the differences in how the federal circuits address the
issue of whether or not to include the weight of a carrier medium that
contains a detectable amount of a controlled substance, other than lyser-
gic acid diethylamide [hereinafter LSD], for purposes of calculating the
base offense level under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 7 Second,
this Comment examines how the 1993 amendments to tile Sentencing
Guidelines will affect future sentencing determinations. 8
I. BACKGROUND
Congress' attempts to fight drug trafficking, partially codified in 21
U.S.C. § 8419 and section 2D 1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, 10 are the
focal points of the inconsistency among the Federal circuits.
A. Brief History of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines section 2D1.1
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter the Reform Act] I
was enacted to "enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to
combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system." 12 The intent
of the Reform Act was to focus judicial discretion with a highly struc-
tured sentencing scheme designed to promote honesty,13 uniformity and
6. Compare United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
waste water is part of the "mixture") with United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129 (6111
Cir. 1991) (holding that only the consumable part of the carrier to be part of the "mixture
or substance").
7. See infra notes 47-214 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 215-239 and accompanying text.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. 1992).
10. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
11. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was passed as Chapter !1 of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-437, § 211-39, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1988)).
12. U.S.S.G. § IA(3), intro, comment.
13. "By 'honesty' Congress meant to end the previous system whereby i judge
might sentence an offender to twelve years, but the Parole Commission could release him
after four." Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the KeY Compro-
206 [Vol 12
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proportionality 14 in sentencing.15 The Reform Act established the Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission in order to promulgate detailed sentencing
guidelines which judges are required to follow. 16
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198417 amended § 841 so
that sentences would be determined according to the weight of the drug
involved. 18 However, the weights prescribed by the amended statute
lacked any reference to mixtures or substances; it referred only to the
weights of the drugs themselves. 19 Two years later, certain aspects of
the sentencing scheme, specifically the relevant weights of the drugs,
were replaced by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.20 This Act amended
21 U.S.C. § 841, inter alia, by increasing the penalties for drug offenses
involving various amounts of the listed drugs.2 1 These penalties were
designated for offenses involving the weights of mixtures of narcotics. 22
In United States v. Daly2 3 the court held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
accomplished this by establishing the measurement of drug quantities
and, therefore, the guidelines by which to assign minimum penalties.24
The court held "[p]ursuant to various amendments to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) ... penalties ... were henceforth to be assessed not (as under
prior law) according to the involved quantity of the drug itself, but in-
stead according to the involved quantity of any 'mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount' of the drug." 25 The result of this par-
mises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1, 4 (1988) (citing Anthony Partridge
& William B. Eldridge, THE SECOND CIRcurr SENTENCING STUDY: A REpOrT TO TIF
JUDGES, 1-3 (1974)).
14. Id. By "uniformity" and "proportionality," Congress meant -to reduce
.unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity." Id.
15. U.S.S.G. § IA(3), intro. comment.
16. Id. "The United States Sentencing Commission ... is an independent agcnc. in
the judicial branch .... Its principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and prac-
tices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends orjustice by prom-
ulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted
of federal crimes." U.S.S.G. § IA(t), intro, comment.
17. The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. Pub. L. No 98-
473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3437, is a chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1837.
18. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3437.
19. Id. at 3440.
20. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 3207.
21. See H.R. RE!. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-5 (1986).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(i)-(viii); 841(b)(l)(B)(i)-(viii) (referring to an%
"mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of the listed narcotics).
23. 883 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied. 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(v)).
19951
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ticular wording was that sentences could now be determined based on
the total weight of the narcotic, including substances other than the drug
itself.26 To further promote this end, Congress "adopted a 'market-
oriented' approach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total
quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug in-
volved, is used to determine the length of sentence." 27 This sentencing
scheme was designed to target both the high and low level trafficker in
the drug distribution chain. 28 Street level traffickers were considered
appropriate targets of the statute "because they keep the street markets
going."29 In examining Congress' intent the Supreme Court explained
this policy by stating:
[Congress] intended the penalties for drug trafficking to be graduated ac-
cording to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were found-cut
or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at
the retail level. Congress did not want to punish retail traffickers less se-
verely, even though they deal in smaller quantities of the pure drug, be-
cause such traffickers keep the street markets going. 30
Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines established a range of
sentences for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.31 The Sentencing Commis-
sion calculated the guideline ranges for these violations using the statu-
tory minimum penalties of § 841.32 As in § 841, the Sentencing Guide-
lines did not refer to the amount of pure narcotics involved, but rather to
mixtures and substances containing detectable amounts of controlled
substances. 33 To this end, the Sentencing Guidelines followed Congress'
approach to drug trafficking as codified in § 841.34 The Commission
26. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that it is
proper to include the weight of LSD and the weight of blotter paper in which the LSD is
combined).
27. Id. at 461. See H.R. REP. No. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 11-12, 17
(1986).
28. H.R. REP. No. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 12 (1986).
29. Id.
30. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 12 (1986)).
31. See U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1.
32. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.I, comment. (n.10).
33. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1, comment. (n.1). A footnote to the Drug Quantity Table fol-
lowing § 2DI.1 provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled
substance set forth in the table refers- to the entire weight of any mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance." U.S.S.G. §2DI. 1(c) (n. *)
Drug Quantity Table.
34. Theresa Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 413
[Vol 12
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concluded that "[c]onsistent with the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, if any mixture [or] compound contains any detectable amount of a
controlled substance, the entire amount of the mixture or compound
shall be considered in measuring the quantity." 35
Although Congress used the phrase "mixture or substance containing
a detectable amount" throughout § 841(b) as a basis for calculating the
quantity of controlled substances, it failed to provide a clear definition
for this phrase. 36 Likewise, the Sentencing Commission declined to
clarify the meaning of the phrase. Instead the Sentencing Guidelines
simply state that "'[m]ixture or substance' as used in this guideline has
the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C. § 841 .... "37 Hence, Congress and
the Sentencing Commission have left the courts with the difficult task of
deciding which combinations of narcotics should be considered
"mixtures or substances" for sentencing purposes.
B. Chapman v. United States: 77e Supreme Court's Interpretation of
"Mixture or Substance"
In Chapman v. United States,38 the Court addressed the "mixture or
substance" issue within the context of LSD distribution.39 In determin-
ing the proper definition, the Court relied on the legislative history of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)40 and the history of Congress' efforts to control the dis-
tribution of controlled substances.41 According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a seven-to-two majority, "[n]either the statute nor
the Sentencing Guidelines define the terms 'mixture' or 'substance,' nor
do they have any established common-law meaning. Those terms there-
(1991). "Guidelines sentencing apparently is meeting the congressional goal of stiffening
penal sanctions for drug offenders." Id. at 416.
35. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, at 2.39 (n.*) (1988).
36. The words are neither defined in the statute itself nor by its legislative history.
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); M.R. REP. No. 99-845, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, (1986).
37. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.l).
38. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
39. Petitioner was convicted in the district court of selling ten sheets (1,000 doses)
of blotter paper containing LSD. Id. at 455. Although petitioner's pure LSD weighed
approximately fifty milligrams, the court included the total weight of the blotter paper
and LSD, a total of 5.7 grams, in calculating his sentence. Id. at 455-56. The total weight
of 5.7 grams resulted in the "imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence of five
years required by § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) for distributing more than one gram of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of LSD." Id. at 456.
40. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(v) (1988).
41. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460.
1995]
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fore must be given their ordinary meaning." 42 Rehnquist added that the
term mixture "does not include LSD in a bottle, or LSD in a car, because
the drug is easily distinguished from, and separated from, such a
'container."' 43 According to the Court, the "ordinary meaning" defini-
tion supports the rational intent of Congress to measure quantity based
on the "street weight" of the drugs, measured at the time the drugs are
sold, rather than according to the net weight of the active component.4
4
As a result, the Chapman Court determined that the carrier medium, in
this case blotter paper, combined with LSD fell within the ordinary
meaning of the word "mixture." 45
According to Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent in Chapman, "the
majority's construction of the statute will necessarily produce sen-
tences... that will undermine the very uniformity that Congress sought
to achieve when it adopted the Sentencing Guidelines." 46 Therefore,
because the "ordinary meaning" definition adopted by the Court in
Chapman left open the possibility of different interpretations, it is not
surprising that the lower courts continue to struggle with how to deter-
mine the weight of the controlled substance when drugs are "mixed"
with carrier mediums.
II. SEEKING A DEFINITION OF "MIXTURE OR
SUBSTANCE" IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman, the federal circuits
have reached contrary conclusions on this issue, because the circuit
courts have attached different meanings to the phrase "mixture or sub-
stance." These different interpretations of the statutory language gener-
ally fall into three categories. 47 Courts in the first category have applied
42. Id. at 461-62. The Court stated:
Neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines defines the terms "'mixture" and
"substance," nor do they have any established common-law meaning. Those
terms, therefore, must be given their ordinary meaning. A -'mixture" is defined to
include "a portion of matter consisting of two or more components.., that how-
ever thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate existence."
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THID NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1449 (1986)).
43. Id. at 462-63.
44. Id. at 465.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Since Chapman, the Fourth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have
not explicitly adopted any of these approaches. In a pre-Chapman decision, the Fourth
Circuit held in United States v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 498
[Vol 12
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a literal meaning to the term "mixture or substance" which closely fol-
lows the Chapman decision. 48 Courts in the second category have
shifted away from the literal interpretation of the statutory language and
have followed a more lenient approach when distinguishing their cases
from Chapmn, in order to exclude the weights of non-controlled sub-
stances when making sentencing determinations. 49 Courts in the final
category use a hybrid approach which combines the reasoning of the
other classifications and treat the poisonous waste from methampheta-
mine differently than uningestable carrier-mediums or packaging mate-
rials.50
A. The "Literal" Courts
The First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have con-
cluded that the weight of uningestable material containing a detectable
amount of a controlled substance should be used in calculating the base
offense level of a convicted drug trafficker.5 1
i. The First Circuit
The First Circuit, starting with United States r. Mahecha-Onofre,52
has taken the position that the weight of a carrier medium should be in-
cluded for sentencing purposes if the mediums are "mixed" in any way
with the illegal drugs.53
In Mahecha-Onofre (decided less than one month after Chapman). the
defendant, Luis Mahecha-Onofre, was convicted under 21 U.S.C.
U.S. 985 (1990), that "[u]nder the plain language of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the
Guidelines, the combined gross weight of a narcotic and any carrier medium mk be used
for the purposes of determining the base offense levels under § 2D 1.1.- Id. (citing United
States v. Daly, 893 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1988).
48. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying teXt.
49. See infra notes 97-171 and accompanying test.
50. See infra notes 172-214 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
waste by-product of P-2-P manufacturing process be included in drug sentencing). cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994): United States v. Mahecha-Onofre. 936 F.2d 623 (1st
Cir.) (holding that the total weight of a suitcase consisting of a blend of cocaine and
acrylic, minus its metal parts, was properly considered in determining the appropriate
sentence), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991).
52. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.). cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1009 (1991).
53. Id. at 626. See also United States v. Lopez-Gil. 965 F.2d 1124 (ist Cir.)
(cocaine secreted within a fiberglass suitcase). cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992).
United States v. Restrepo-Contreras. 942 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1991) (bees%%ax status- con-
taining cocaine). cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1066 (1992).
1995]
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§ 841(a)(1) of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.54 The co-
caine was hidden in two suitcases specially constructed to avoid detec-
tion.55 A field test revealed that the suitcases, belonging to the defen-
dant, were themselves made of cocaine. 56 It was later shown that the
suitcases were constructed from 2.5 kilograms of cocaine chemically
bonded with acrylic, weighing a total of twelve kilograms.57 The district
court determined Mahecha-Onofre's base level offense using the total
weight of the suitcases (approximately twelve kilograms), minus all the
metal parts, rather than the weight of the 2.5 kilograms of cocaine actu-
ally found in the suitcases. 58
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision holding that the
lower court was correct in using the total weight of the cocaine/acrylic
suitcase (minus the metal parts) when determining the defendant's sen-
tence. 59 The court held that any carrier medium that is chemically
bonded with a drug substance is part of that drug "mixture." 60 In reach-
ing its decision, the First Circuit applied the reasoning used by the Su-
preme Court in Chapman. The court noted that, unlike the blotter paper
in Chapman, the suitcase material obviously could not be consumed, but
concluded that this fact alone did not command a different outcome, "for
'ingestion' would not seem to play a critical role in the definition of
'mixture' or 'substance." 61 According to the First Circuit, one reason
why the Sentencing Commission and Congress have explicitly refrained
from considering drug purity in the sentencing determination is that
weight and purity generally correlate with the seriousness of the crime:
"[t]hat is to say, a defendant who has more of the drug is also likely to
have purer drug (not in every case, but, very roughly speaking, in many
cases)." 62 Applying this reasoning, the court noted that it was important
to observe that the effort required to create a suitcase made of chemni-
cally bonded cocaine and acrylic "suggests a serious drug smuggling
effort of a sort that might warrant increased punishment."63
54. Alahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 624.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 625.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 626.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. According to the First Circuit, Congress has determined that the extra effort
required to determine the purity of a drug is not necessary for correlating punishment
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The First Circuit applied the same reasoning in two subsequent cases
involving the importation of cocaine, United States v. Restrepo-
Contreras64 and United States v. Lopez-Gil.65 In Restrepo-Contreras,
the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute co-
caine after customs agents determined that eleven beeswax statues in his
luggage contained cocaine combined with the wax.66 The First Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to use the entire weight of the
eleven statues in determining the defendant's sentence. 67 The court was
not persuaded by the defendant's argument that the district court incor-
rectly applied the term "mixture or substance" when it included the
weight of the beeswax statue for sentencing purposes. 68 The Restrepo-
Contreras court, in passing, mentioned the Supreme Court's decision in
Chapman, but it relied solely on the First Circuit's decision in Mahecha-
Onofire as precedent. The Court explained that "we can discern no
meaningful difference between an acrylic-cocaine suitcase and a bees-
wax-cocaine statue."69 The court added that "[s]ince the statues unques-
tionably contained a detectable amount of cocaine, the evidence was
sufficient to support conviction under § 841(a)(1)."70
In United States v. Lopez-Gil, a case factually similar to Mahecha-
Onofre, the court calculated the defendant's sentence using the total
weight of suitcases made, in part, of cocaine.71 The court, citing both
Chapman and Mahecha-Onofre, agreed with the district court that the
cocaine was sufficiently "mixed" with the suitcase and thus affirmed the
sentence. 72 With these three decisions, the First Circuit has established
64. 942 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992).
65. 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992).
66. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d at 97.
67. Id. at99.
68. Id. Although the defendant argued his case to the First Circuit approximately
six months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman, the court did not publish
the Restrepo-Contreras decision until some three months after Chapman xvas decided.
69. Id. at 99. "fThis fact alone can[not] make a difference in the outcome, for
'ingestion' would not seem to play a critical role in the definition of 'mixture' or
'substance."' United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 626 (lst Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991).
70. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d at 99 n.l.
71. United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1129 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 484 (1992). The facts of the two cases are very similar with the exception that the
cocaine in Lopez-Gil was not chemically bonded with the suitcase to the same extent as
the cocaine was in Mahecha-Onofire. Id. at 1125-27.
72. Id. at 1127. Although not sufficiently explained, the court held the chemically
bonded cocaine to be a mixture with the suitcase, rather than the suitcase acting as a
container for the cocaine and, that a mixture is not "easily distinguished from, and sepa-
19951
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itself as among the most stringent in its reading of the phrase "mixture
or substance."
ii. The Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Young,73 the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant
was properly sentenced to 188 months imprisonment following his
guilty plea to possessing Dilaudid 74 with intent to distribute. 75 The court
concluded that the defendant's sentence was correctly calculated based
upon the weight of the entire tablet and not just the amount of the hy-
dromorphine involved.76 The court, in reaching its decision, relied on
the language found in the footnote following the Drug Quantity Table.77
The defendant in Young argued that the exclusion of the "mixture or
substance" language in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c) indicated that Congress
only intended the weight of the hydromorphine to be included in the cal-
culation. 78 However, the Eighth Circuit, following the examples of other
circuits, 79 held that the Sentencing Commission adopted the same
method for computing the weight of pharmaceuticals as Congress had
adopted for "street drugs" listed in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(a) and (b) and,
therefore, the entire weight of the Dilaudid tablet should be included in
sentencing calculations. 80
iii. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit also includes the weight of uningestable materials
as being part of the entire amount for the purposes of sentencing.8 I In
United States v. Dorrough,82 the defendant was convicted "for attempt-
rated from such a container." Id. at 1127 (quoting Chapman v. United States. 500 U.S.
453, 462-63 (1991)).
73. 992 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1993).
74. Dilaudid, a synthetic heroin, is a pharmaceutically manufactured pain killer.
The active ingredient in Dilaudid is hydromorphine, which is a schedule I1 controlled
substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 812; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, 1126 (1994 ed.)
("Dilaudid is a narcotic analgesic; its principal therapeutic effect is relief of pain.").
75. Young, 992 F.2d at 208 n. 1.
76. Id. at 209.
77. Id. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
78. Young, 992 F.2d at 209.
79. See United States v. Shabazz, 933 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
McNeil v. United States, 502 U.S. 964 (1991); United States v. Lazarchik, 924 F.2d 211
(I Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
80. Young, 992 F.2d at 210.
81. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
82. 927 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1991).
[Vol 12
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ing to manufacture phenyl-2-propanone and amphetamine and for pos-
session of phenyl-2-propanone with intent to manufacture ampheta-
mine." 83 The defendant argued on appeal that the district court applied
the incorrect base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines and
contended that the correct weight for calculating the base offense level,
in a manufacturing case, should be the maximum amount of drugs that
could be produced from the manufacturing process.84 The defendant
also argued that the waste products of the process should not have been
included. 85 The circuit court disagreed with the defendant and affirmed
the district court's decision that the correct base offense level was thirty
four. 86
In United States v. Nguyen,87 the court of appeals held that the district
court had correctly included the weight of the sodium bicarbonate pow-
der when determining the defendant's sentence after he pled guilty to
two counts of cocaine base distribution. 88 The defendant had argued that
his sentence was contrary to the intent of the Sentencing Guidelines and
was "grossly exaggerate[d]" since crack cocaine is not normally com-
bined with sodium bicarbonate powder.89 The court compared the de-
fendant's arguments with the Supreme Court's holding in Chapman and
determined that Chapman decided "the intent of Congress [was] to es-
tablish a 'market-oriented' approach for sentencing .... Thus, the form
of the drug would not matter... "90 The Nguyen court further explained
that its decision was based partially on Congress' intent to punish retail-
83. Id. at 499. "Phenyl-2-propanone is a controlled substance produced by heating
chemicals under the proper conditions. It is then heated in combination with other
chemicals to produce amphetamine." Id. at 499 n.l.
84. Id. at 502. The trial court sentenced the defendant on a base offense level of 34.
The court arrived at this level by "multiplying the 94 liters of liquid containing [phenyl-
2-propanonel that was found at the laboratory by the .375 cocaine equivalency formula
contained in the Guidelines' drug equivalency table and arriving at a cocaine equivalency
of 35.25 kilograms.' Id. The defendant contended that the base offense level of 34 was
incorrect and should have been 28. This calculation was based on the testimony of a
defense chemist who concluded that only 8.85 kilograms of phenyl-2-propanone could
have been produced. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 1 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 1993).
88. Id. at 975. The court concluded that, although the district court had incorrectly
portrayed the drugs as being made up entirely of pure cocaine instead of a mixture of
cocaine and sodium bicarbonate powder (baking soda), it was a harmless error because
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ers who distributed drugs in any form, 9 1 and the intended principles of
the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the ordinary definition of the term
"mixture," made inclusion of the baking soda proper.92
In United States v. Richards,93 the Tenth Circuit, in dicta, took the
opportunity to explain its rationale for the inclusion of waste products,
when computing the base offense level under section 2D .I of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.94 The court noted that Chapman did not compel a
change in the law of the Tenth Circuit, nor did it contradict any previous
decisions. 95 Finally, the court stated:
[t]hat decision [Chapman] did not deal with the elements involved in the
drug manufacturing process, nor did it identify any elements of a mixture
that should not be included in computing total mixture weight. Chapman
simply explained why Congress rationally included the weight of the car-
rier medium along with the weight of the drug.
96
B. The "Lenient" Courts
In contrast to the decisions of the "literal" courts, the Second, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the weight of
unusable or uningestable portions of mixtures containing a detectable
amount of a controlled substance should not be used when making a
sentencing determination. 97 Generally, the "lenient" courts, in their in-
91. Id.
92. Id. The Tenth Circuit reiterated its belief that the "market-oriented" approach
was reasonable insofar as it punished retailers in the street market by not reducing sen-
tences for lack of purity of the mixture. Id. The court also noted that the baking soda
could have remained in the final cocaine base form after distillation. Id.
93. 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993), grant of post-conviction relief affid, 1995 WL
596840 (10th Cir. Oct. 11, 1995). The defendant pled guilty to "possession of I kilogram
or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine in powder form, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(a)." Id.
at 1370; see also discussion infra part Ill.
94. Richards, 5 F.3d at 1371. At district court, the defendant filed two motions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The first motion was denied, but the court entertained the
second motion, in which the defendant claimed, for the first time, that the waste water
was incorrectly included in the base offense level, and therefore, the district court had
misapplied the sentencing guidelines. Id. The district court granted this motion and sub-
sequently reduced the defendant's sentence from 188 months to 60 months. Id. The gov-
ernment subsequently filed its appeal opposing the grant of the defendant's second mo-
tion. Id. The court agreed with the government's position and held that the defendant's
motion "was procedurally barred for his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal or in an
earlier § 2255 motion .... Id. at 1370.
95. Id. at 1371.
96. Id.
97. See discussion infra parts II.B.i-v.
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terpretation of the term "mixture," have not included products that are
either uningestable or unmarketable.
i. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Rolande-Gabriel,9 8 was the
first circuit to impose a marketability and ingestability requirement. In
Rolande-Gabriel, after the defendant pled guilty to the importation of
cocaine, the district court sentenced her based on the total weight of the
liquid in which she had concealed the cocaine. 99 The total weight of the
liquid was 241.6 grams while the mostly dissolved powder weighed 72.2
grams. 100 Sixty-five out of the 72.2 grams of powder was a cutting
agent, leaving only 7.2 grams of actual cocaine base.lOl
Defendant argued that the district court incorrectly included the
weight of the liquid, based on the fact that the liquid was unrelated to the
cocaine's use, and that the drug was unusable until the powder was sepa-
rated from the liquid. 102 Defendant also argued that "widely divergent
sentences will arise from the inclusion of unusable carrier mediums."103
The Eleventh Circuit considered this line of reasoning and held that the
Sentencing Guidelines Statutory Mission and Policy Statement "clearly
and plainly indicate that the primary purpose of the guidelines system is
to create a scheme of 'uniform and rational' sentencing." 104 Considering
this policy statement, the court decided that section 2DI.! should be ap-
plied in "a manner which creates the greatest degree in uniformity and
rationality in sentencing."105
Considering this interpretation of section 2DI.I, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the liquid waste should not have been included in the sentenc-
ing determination under the Sentencing Guidelines.106 In reversing the
defendant's sentence, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the marketable
and ingestable nature of the LSD and blotter paper in Chapman, as dis-
98. 938 F.2d 1231 (1lth Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 1233. Defendant was caught attempting to import sixteen plastic bags
containing a liquid substance and cocaine. Id. at 1232.
100. Id. at 1233.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The defendant described, as an example, a situation where a defendant with
only "one ounce of usable cocaine and a defendant with one ounce of usable cocaine
mixed with an unusable liquid having a total weight of ten ounces, would receive sub-
stantially different sentences for essentially the same offense." Id.
104. Id. at 1235. See U.S.S.G. § IA(3), intro, comment.
105. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1235.
106. Id. at 1238.
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tinguished from the liquid and cocaine combination used in Rolande-
Gabriel.107 The court emphasized that the LSD considered in Chapman
was characterized as "usable, consumable, and ready for wholesale or
retail distribution when placed on standard carrier mediums, such as
blotter paper... [however], the cocaine mixture in this case was obvi-
ously unusable while mixed with the liquid." 108 The court further de-
termined that the term "mixture," as used in 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b) and sec-
tion 2DI.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, did not encompass unusable
mixtures: 109
The [Chapman] Court stated that the inclusion of the weight of the stan-
dard carrier mediums is rational because standard carrier mediums fa-
cilitate the use, marketing and access of LSD and other drugs. The liquid
waste in this case, however, did not accomplish any of these purposes.
The inclusion of the carrier medium of unusable liquid waste in this case
for sentencing is irrational. 1 10
The court of appeals also analogized the liquid to a "packing material"
because it was easily distinguished from the cocaine and cutting
agent.l I1 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit has restricted its interpretation
of "mixture or substance" to "drug mixtures which are usable in the
chain of distribution." 112
ii. The Sixth Circuit
In United States v. Jennings,'l 3 the Sixth Circuit relied on the
"market-oriented" approach that considers carrier material or waste from
drug manufacturing as a part of the "mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount" of the drug in question only if it is consumable with
the drug.1 14 In Jennings, the defendants were interrupted in the process
107. Id. at 1237.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1238. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted how the Chapman Court
recognized "that 'hypothetical cases can be imagined involving heavy carriers and very
little [drug].' and that the case at bar was this very situation. Id. at 1237-38 (quoting
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 466 (1991)). The Rolande-Gabriel court then
noted that "[t]here are real facts present in this case that are dramatically different from
Chapman which this court cannot overlook." Id. at 1238.
110. Id. (quoting Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted)).
I11. Id.
112. Id. See also United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088 (1 Ith Cir. 1992) (holding
that the district court improperly included the weight of a liquid (wine), in which cocaine
was suspended, for sentencing purposes).
113. 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991).
114. Id. at 137.
218 [Vol 12
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [1996], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss1/7
"MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE"
of "cooking" methamphetamine.1 15 The district court found the entire
4,180 grams of chemicals involved to be a mixture containing a detect-
able amount of methamphetamine and included it in its sentencing de-
termination.116 The defendants argued that if the chemicals had been
allowed to react, the final product would have weighed much less. 117
The court of appeals agreed and remanded for re-sentencing, reasoning
that the inclusion of poisonous by-products of the manufacturing process
would be illogical and contrary to Congress' intent-ll8 "[i]t seems for-
tuitous, and unwarranted by the statute, to hold the defendants punish-
able for the entire weight of a mixture when they could have neither
produced that amount of methamphetamine nor distributed the mixture
containing methamphetamine." 119
The court distinguished the methamphetamine mixture in Jennings
from the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman by emphasizing that
"the defendants were not attempting to increase the amount of metham-
phetamine they had available to sell by adding a dilutant, cutting agent,
or carrier medium, but rather were attempting to distill methampheta-
mine from the otherwise uningestable byproducts [sic] of its manufac-
ture."120 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for sentencing, with
directions for the district court to determine the amount of metham-
phetamine that could have been manufactured from the chemical mix-
ture. 12 1
iii. The Second Circuit
In United States v. Acosta,122 the court of appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that the district court mistakenly included the weight of an un-
usable creme liqueur, in which cocaine had been dissolved, in the total
weight of the cocaine involved in the case.123 Although the liqueur and
cocaine combination may have fit the dictionary definition of the term
"mixture," the function, and not the form of the creme liqueur, in light of
115. Id. at 134.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 136.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 137.
121. Id.
122. 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992). The defendant attempted to import cocaine by
mixing the drug with the contents of six bottles of creme liqueur. Id. at 552.
123. Id. The cocaine without the creme liqueur weighed 2.245 kilograms. hL The
cocaine with the liqueur weighed 4.662 kilograms and the defendant argued that this
would result in a sentencing range 10-13 months longer. Id.
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the legislative history, convinced the court that the weight of the creme
liqueur must be excluded. 124 According to the court, Congress was con-
cerned with the product that would eventually reach the streets, (i.e.,
consumable mixtures). 125 Furthermore, the court determined that since
Congress intended to create a "market-oriented" approach to combat
drug trafficking, the culpability of the defendant in Acosta was no dif-
ferent than that of defendants who did not conceal the drug in liqueur.126
Essentially, the same quantity of drugs would reach the street market. 127
The Second Circuit distinguished its holding from Chapman by look-
ing at the fact that the LSD in Chapman was ready for consumption,
while the cocaine/liqueur mixture in Acosta was useless and uningest-
able. 128 The Acosta court held it essential that the cocaine would have
had to been distilled out of the liqueur before distribution, and that the
liqueur was merely a mask to conceal the cocaine and as such, the court
considered the liqueur "the functional equivalent of packing mate-
rial." 129 Packing material, according to the court, is "clearly is not to be
included in weight calculation."130
Similarly, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Salgado-Molina,131
with facts almost identical to those in Acosta, had little trouble in
reaching the same conclusion that the weight of the liqueur in which the
cocaine was concealed should not be included in the sentencing deter-
mination. 132 The court suggested the following hypothetical situation
124. Id. at 554.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court held that:
Viewed through a market-oriented prism, there is no difference in culpability
between individuals bringing the identical amount and purity of drugs to the
market but concealing the drugs in different amounts of unusable mix-
tures .... Sentencing these individuals differently.. . would also fly in the face
of the fundamental underpinnings of the Guidelines, namely, uniformity and pro-
portionality in sentencing.
Id.
127. Id. (reasoning that it would make no difference to the street market value if the
cocaine was smuggled into the country in ten kilograms of liquid or if it was brought in
twenty kilograms of liquid).
128. Id. at 555.
129. Id. at 554 (citing United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1237 (1 Ith
Cir. 1991)).
130. Id. The court compared the situation in the case at bar to Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Chapman as to what is, and what is not to be considered a mixture. Id.; see
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
131. 967 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1992).
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which was meant to demonstrate how "fundamentally absurd" it would
be if the court was to reach the opposite conclusion: 133
[U]nder a broad application of Chapman, if one could "float a few kilo-
grams of cocaine across the ocean" and "extract the cocaine from the
ocean," the weight of the entire Atlantic Ocean would be used to com-
pute that defendant's base offense level. Including the liquid in this case
as a measure of punishment is no more rational than including the weight
of the Atlantic Ocean in sentencing the hypothetical ocean smuggler.134
iv. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Rodriquez,135 the Third Circuit held that a mixture
comprised of cocaine and boric acid was not a "mixture or substance"
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 or section 2DI.l of the Sentencing Guidelines. 136
In Rodriquez, the defendant sold blocks of "cocaine" to DEA agents.
After testing the blocks, the DEA chemists determined that the blocks
consisted of only 65.1 grams of actual cocaine and 2976 grams of boric
acid. 137 According to the court, the particles of the boric acid had not
mixed with the cocaine and could be easily be distinguished from the
cocaine on visual inspection because of their different colors. 138 The
court distinguished Chapman on the basis that the boric acid was not
intended to be used as a cutting agent and, unlike the blotter paper in
Chapman, "did not facilitate the distribution of the cocaine." 139
The Third Circuit also distinguished this case from the ordinary case
where the cocaine is dispersed with an agent in order to increase the
133. Id. at 29.
134. Id.
135. 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992).
136. Id. at 1007.
137. Id. at 1001. "In essence, the brick-like packages were constructed in an effort to
fool an unsuspecting customer... into thinking that they were compressed wholly of
cocaine' Id. The defendant compressed boric acid into blocks and covered them with
yellow tape. He then spread a thin layer of cocaine over the tape. A hole was drilled into
each block and then filled with cocaine. Lastly, the defendant wrapped the blocks in
plastic and brown paper. A buyer could examine the cocaine that covered the top surface
and could sample the cocaine placed in the hole. The plastic and brown paper, however,
prevented a buyer from observing the bottom and sides of the blocks and determining the
true nature of the contents of the block. Id.
138. Id. at 1005. "When particles are mixed together it takes more effort to separate
them than to scrape one layer from another. Though the boric acid and cocaine were
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amount of the drug available to the seller. 140 The court recognized that
this "was not the ordinary drug product moving in the stream of com-
merce in the manner envisioned by Congress." 14 1 The Rodriquez court,
as the court did in Acosta, noted that the boric acid "functioned more
like a packaging material on which and into which the cocaine was
placed and from which the cocaine would have to be removed for use.
Chapman recognized that packaging material was not to be included in
the weight calculation." 142 The court concluded by stating that the dis-
tinction between usable and unusable mixture made in other jurisdic-
tions, which followed the same line of reasoning, better promoted the
goals of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.
143
v. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Johnson,144 held that waste
water left over from the manufacturing process of crack cocaine should
not be included in computing a defendant's sentence. 145 In Johnson, the
defendant was found guilty of "knowingly and intentionally possessing,
with intent to distribute, more than fifty grams of cocaine."1 46 The total
weight of the crack recovered, including cutting agents and adulterants,
but excluding the waste water, was 47.4 grams, 147 and the waste water
weighed 31.89 grams.148
In Johnson, the court looked to Congress' "market-oriented" ap-
proach, in which the total quantity of the substance that is to be distrib-
uted, rather than the amount of the pure drug, for sentencing pur-
poses. 149 The court held that Congress' focus "was on the weight of the
drug mixtures 'ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at the retail
140. Id. at 1006. "[Tjhe undisputed facts here show that the cocaine was used only to
effectuate the scam by masking the identity of the boric acid blocks." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1007. "We find that the usable/unusable differentiation adopted by the
Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, rather than the First Circuit approach, best
follows the reasoning in Chapman." Id.
144. 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993).
145. Id. at 1197.
146. Id. at 1193. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
147. Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1194. "The process of manufacturing cocaine base or
'crack' consists of mixing regular cocaine and baking soda in water. The mixture is then
heated. The cocaine base can be removed with a spoon when it settles to the bottom of
the water." Id. at 1194 n.3.
148. Id. at 1194.
149. Id. at 1195 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461 (1991)).
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level."' 150 The court, relying on the Second Circuit's reasoning in
United States v. Acosta, explained that the waste water did not facilitate
the distribution of the crack cocaine, in that the cocaine was not depend-
ent on the waste water for ingestion, and the water did not in any way
increase the amount of drug available at the retail level and therefore,
should not be included. 15 1 The Seventh Circuit concluded by stating
that, because Congress was mainly concerned with mixtures that will
eventually reach the streets, the issue before the court was marketability,
not purity, and the waste water here had no marketable value. 152
Less than one year after its decision in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Tucker, 153 held that the inclusion of the entire weight of
both the cocaine base (crack cocaine) and the water with which it was
mixed was proper for sentencing.154 Based on this decision, the defen-
dant was convicted of distributing five grams or more of cocaine
base. 155 The weight of the cocaine base was 5.2 grams at the time of the
defendant's arrest. 156 However, upon a reweighing several months after
the indictment, the cocaine base weighed 4.04 grams. 157 The forensic
scientist who weighed the cocaine base explained that .2 grams were
used for qualitative analysis, and that the balance of the weight loss was
due to the evaporation of water from the original sample. 158 At sen-
tencing, the defendant objected to the use of the 5.2 grams as the weight,
contending that water is not a controlled substance and that the court
should calculate the appropriate sentence based solely on the weight of
the pure cocaine.159 The court dismissed his argument by stating that
because water is necessary for the creation of cocaine base and users of
150. Id. (quoting Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461).
151. Id. at 1196. "Under a market-oriented approach, when the mixture is not ingest-
able and therefore not marketable, there is no rational basis to a sentence based on the
entire weight of a useless mixture." Id. (citing United States v. Acosta, 963 U.S. 55 1, 555
(2d Cir. 1992)).
152. Id. (citing Acosta, 963 U.S. at 555).
153. 20 F.3d 242 (7th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 244.
155. Id. at 243.
156. Id.
157. Id. The difference between the original weight and the weight of the cocaine
base when reweighed several months later was relevant to the defendant because
"distributing five grams or more of cocaine base carries with it a minimum of ive years
imprisonment." Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b).
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it need not wait for the water to evaporate before using the cocaine base,
the two are part of a "mixture."160
At first glance it appears that the decision of the Tucker court was in
opposition to that of the Johnson court,16 1 by holding that the water,
along with the cocaine base and baking soda, is "part of a whole,
blended together, and therefore comport[s] with the common under-
standing of 'mixture' recognized in Chapman,"162 and should be in-
cluded in the sentencing determination.163 The Tucker court based its
holding on the market-oriented approach and stated that "the form in
which the Illinois State Police found the cocaine base in this case, it
weighed 5.2 grams, and sentencing [the defendant] based on the weight
of the cocaine base as found satisfies the intent of Congress as recog-
nized by Chapman." 164
In Ambriz v. United States,165 the defendant, pursuant to a plea
agreement, was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment for
"knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute"
1000 grams of cocaine.166 The defendant argued on appeal that he
should have been sentenced only for the 22.5 grams of cocaine that he
possessed and that the district court was incorrect when it included the
weight of the dirt for sentencing purposes.167 The Court of Appeals
disagreed with the defendant and cited to earlier Seventh Circuit cases in
which defendants had attempted to possess large quantities of cocaine
but, because of substitutions by the government, ended up possessing
only a small fraction of that amount168 and the court properly used the
weight of the entire mixture for sentencing determination. 169
160. Id. at 244.
161. The Johnson court held that the waste water was not marketable because it
contained only a "trace amount of the cocaine [base] suspended in the liquid." United
States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1993). In Tucker, the court held that the
water was part of the cocaine base and was marketable as such. Tucker, 20 F.3d at 244.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court went further to say that "[w]ater is a part of cocaine base, not
something used to carry it...." Id.
164. Id.
165. 14 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1994).
166. Id. at 332. The defendant thought he was taking possession of one kilogram of
cocaine, but prior to his arrest "law enforcement officers removed all but 22.5 grams of
the cocaine... [and] replaced it with approximately 977.5 grams of dirt." Id.
167. Id. at 333. "Under the... Guidelines, a sentence for the 22.5 grams of cocaine
would put Ambriz's sentencing level at 12 and make him eligible for a sentence of 10-16
months .... Instead, under the district court's approach, Ambriz was eligible for sen-
tencing level 26 and a 63-78 month sentence." Id. (citations omitted).
168. See United States v. Levia, 959 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that defen-
dants were properly sentenced for 30 kilograms of cocaine where government informants
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The Ambriz court distinguished the present case from Johnson by
noting that the decisive issue in Ambriz was "whether to include material
disguised by the government as cocaine."170 Therefore, the court fo-
cused on the intent of the defendant and stated that, unlike the defendant
in Johnson, "Ambriz was properly sentenced because he tried to possess
the full kilogram of cocaine."17
C. The "Hybrid" Courts
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits can both be construed as "hybrid" cir-
cuits because they treat the poisonous waste from methamphetamine
differently than they treat uningestable carrier-mediums or packing ma-
terials. 172
i. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit, in its approach to sentencing drug offenders, has
adopted an position similar to that of the "strict" courts in cases involv-
ing methamphetamine combined with waste products.173 In United
had actually sold the defendants two kilograms of cocaine and twenty-eight kilograms of
flour), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2372 (1993); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the full 302 grams should be included for sentencing purposes
where DEA agents had replaced 300 grams of cocaine with sugar and left slightly less
than two grams of cocaine).
169. Ambriz, 14 F.3d at 334.
170. Id.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Compare United States v. Walker. 960 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir.) (affirming the
use of the entire weight of a waste product, created by the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine, to determine sentencing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992) with
United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing and re-
manding a sentence for drug trafficking because the entire weight of a liquid containing
cocaine was used to determine sentencing, rather than the weight of the marketable co-
caine). Compare United States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
use of the entire weight of a mixture containing methamphetamine, for sentencing pur-
poses, as being consistent with the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1567 (1994) with United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387. 1391 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that cocaine combined with cornmeal was not a "mixture" under the
Sentencing Guidelines).
173. See United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S.
Ct. 832 (1992), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1422 (1993); United States v. Walker, 960
F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992); United States v. Mueller 902
F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.). cert. denied.
498 U.S. 826 (1989); United States v. Baker, 883 r.2d 13 (5th Cir.). cert. denied 493
U.S. 983 (1989). Often the waste product consists of a liquid by-product of the metham-
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States v. Baker,174 authorities seized a crockpot containing fifty-one
pounds of a mixture, of which approximately eleven pounds was meth-
amphetamine powder and forty pounds was liquid mostly made up of
waste materials. 175 The district court held that the entire weight of the
fifty-one pound mixture should be considered for sentencing pur-
poses. 176 The court explained that determining the base offense level by
reference to the total weight of the mixture "adequately accomplishes
Congress' purposes" of imposing a sentence based on quantity instead of
purity. 177
Similarly, in United States v. Walker,178 police seized various materi-
als of a methamphetamine laboratory; among the materials seized was a
small quantity of methamphetamine dissolved in a toxic liquid.1 79 The
Fifth Circuit, in its decision, rejected the defendant's argument that
Chapman overruled Baker and its progeny and held that district court
properly included the weight of the waste product.180 The court ex-
plained that Chapman "did not involve methamphetamine; nor did it
involve a liquid" and thus did not overrule Baker.18 1 In fact, the court
went further to state that "[t]o the contrary, much of the language of
Chapman supports this court's decision in Baker."182
In United States v. Sherrod,183 DEA agents uncovered a metham-
phetamine laboratory and discovered 17.5 kilograms of precursor
chemicals and small amounts of methamphetamine.1 84 The Fifth Circuit
phetamine manufacturing process. See, e.g., Baker, 883 F.2d at 14. The liquid usually
contains small amounts of methamphetamine but is not ingestable or marketable. Id.
174. 883 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id. at 15.
177. Id.
178. 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992).
179. Id. at 411-12.
180. Id. at 412. The court also stated that it was able to overrule the decision of a
prior Fifth Circuit panel "in the absence of en banc reconsideration or superseding deci-
sion of the Supreme Court." Id. at 412, n.2 (quoting Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932
F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991)).
181. Id. at 412.
182. Id.
183. 964 F.2d 1501 (5th Cir.). cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 832 (1992), and cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1422 (1993).
184. Id. at 1504-05. The defendants also challenged the actual amounts of the liquid
involved. Id. at 1508. The 17.5 kilogram figure was an estimate extrapolated by the gov-
ernment because the DEA agents destroyed the chemical mixtures. Id. at 1507-08. The
court of appeals held that the defendants were not deprived their constitutional rights of
due process and confrontation, by the destruction of the evidence, and stated "the sworn
[Vol 12
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relied on Walker by arguing that the Supreme Court's analysis in Chap-
man did not apply to methamphetamine.185 The court based its argu-
ment on the language of both Chapman and the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 186 According to the Sherrod court, the Supreme Court did not in-
tend its market-oriented analysis from Chapman to apply to metham-
phetamine since the Court established its market-oriented approach after
expressly distinguishing the treatment of LSD from methampheta-
mine.187 Thus, the court held that the entire mixture was properly con-
sidered for sentencing purposes.188
In United States v. Palacios-Molina,189 the Fifth Circuit's holding
followed that of the lenient courts, in cases involving cocaine combined
with waste products. In Palacios-Molina, the court held that tile liquid
portion of a cocaine/liquid mixture "was not a mixture within the
meaning of § 2D1.1"1 90 and should not have been included when calcu-
lating the defendant's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 191 The
defendant objected to the sentencing weight because it included the
waste liquid from the bottles. 192 The circuit court held that the "market-
oriented" approach outlined in Chapman required the exclusion of the
testimony of two government agents is a sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to support the
district court's findings." Id. at 1508.
185. Id. at 1510. See United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir.). cert,
denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992). "Chapman did not involve methamphetamnine; nor did it
involve a liquid. Hence, the Court did not speak to the issue of whether the weight of
liquid waste containing methamphetamine should serve as a basis for computing a de-
fendant's offense level" Id.
186. Sherrod, 964 F.2d at 1510. According to the Fifth Circuit, the market-oriented
analysis in Chapman does not apply for two reasons. Id. First, the commentary in the
Sentencing Guidelines provides that sentences for methamphetamine can be based on
either the weight of the pure drug or on the weight of a mixture containing a detectable
amount of the actual drug. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I). Second, the court in Sherrod
found that because the Guidelines provided an option in methamphetamine cases of us-
ing either the pure weight of the drug or the weight of the mixture containing a detect-
able amount of the drug, the entire weight should be included as long as the mixture
contains a detectable amount. Id.
187. Id. (citing United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 459 (1991)).
188. Sherrod, 964 F.2d at 1511.
189. 7 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1993).
190. Id. at 55. The defendant was arrested in Houston's Intercontinental Airport after
custom officials uncovered powdered cocaine hidden in two aerosol cans he had in his
possession. Id. at 50. Officials also discovered two bottles of sangria containing a thick
liquid which was partially comprised of cocaine. Id.
191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. The defendant argued that if the waste liquid was not included his base of-
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waste liquid in which the cocaine was distilled because the "liquid was
not part of a marketable mixture .... "193
The court distinguished its holding in Palacios-Molina form prior
Fifth Circuit holdings in Walker and Sherrod, both of which involved
methamphetamine, by comparing methamphetamine offenses with co-
caine offenses. 194 The court concluded that the "market-oriented" ap-
proach did not apply to methamphetamine, but was applicable in cases
involving cocaine. 195 The court also distinguished the liquid in this case
from the waste liquid in methamphetamine cases by categorizing the
liquid in the wine bottles as an "otherwise innocuous" method of con-
cealment, whereas the liquids in the methamphetamine cases were
"necessary to the manufacturing and ultimate distribution of the con-
trolled substance." 196
ii. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, treats the poisonous waste
water from methamphetamine differently than it does other uningestable
carrier-mediums or packaging materials. In United States v. Innie,197 the
court used a "strict" approach when it calculated the defendant's sen-
tence based upon the total volume of the liquid mixture containing
metharnphetamine. 198 The defendant argued that the court should have
based his sentence only on the amount of the pure drug involved. 199 fie
claimed that sentencing him based on the entire weight of the mixture
would be irrational because, had the manufacturing process been com-
pleted, a much smaller amount of pure methamphetamine would have
actually been produced; he also objected to the sentence because if in-
193. Id. at 54. "[T]he liquid in the wine bottles in this case was akin to the packaging
material found not to be includible in Chapman." Id. The court stressed that "[u]ndcr the
market oriented approach the issue is marketability." Id. (citing United States v. Acosta,
963 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1992)). The court went further to hold that the cocaine in that
state was not a usable substance and would only be marketable once it was distilled from
the liquid. Id.
194. Id. at 53.
195. Id.
196. Id. In its decision the court also relied on, what was then, the proposed amend-
ments to the Sentencing Guidelines as "at least persuasive authority as to the meaning olf
the term 'mixture."' Id. at 52, n.6; see also discussion infra part Ili.
197. 7 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1567 (1994).
198. Id. at 847. Police found bottles containing methamphetamine in liquid form and
a bottle of acetone in the defendant's motel room. Id. at 843. The liquid methampheta-
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gested, the mixture in its present state was poisonous. 200 The Innie court
held that the entire liquid mixture should be included because, "unlike a
mere packaging agent like the creme liqueur in Acosta or the cornmeal
in Robins, the entire liquid mixture can be said to facilitate the distribu-
tion of methamphetamine because the methamphetamine could not have
been produced without it."201
In United States v. Robins,202 the Ninth Circuit used a lenient ap-
proach to hold that a substance, consisting of .1 gram of cocaine and
2779 grams of cornmeal, was not a mixture within the meaning of the
Sentencing Guidelines. 203 In Robins, the defendant attempted to sell two
blocks of cornmeal, into which he placed small amounts of cocaine near
v-shaped cuts in the tops of the packages.204 After he was convicted, the
district court sentenced the defendant using the weight of the entire co-
caine/cornmeal mixture.205
In reversing the district court's sentencing decision, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the weight of the cornmeal should not be included
in the weight of the cocaine for several reasons. First, the court noted
that the cornmeal was not being used to dilute the cocaine, thus it was
not within the evils that Congress had in mind when it adopted it strat-
egy of basing sentences on the full weight of drug mixtures.206 Second,
the court determined that the cocaine and the cornmeal were not a
"mixture." 207 According to the court, the cornmeal had to be separated
from the cocaine prior to the cocaine being used; therefore, it was the
functional equivalent of packaging material. 208
Finally, the Robins court distinguished the case at bar from its prior
holdings in United States v. Beltran-Felix209 and United States v. Chan
Yu-Chong,2 10 holding that, in those cases, the mixture facilitated the
200. Id. Although ultimately rejecting the defendant's argument, the court noted that
the Sixth Circuit was persuaded by this argument in United States v. Jennings. Id. See
supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 847 (citing United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387. 1390 (9th Cir. 1992)),
202. 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992).
203. Id. at 1388. 1391.
204. Id. at 1388. After the defendant was arrested he stated -1 purchased the corn-
meal because it came in a plastic bag, shaped like a brick of cocaine. I wrapped the
cornmeal plastic bag in duct tape .... I then made V-shaped cuts in both bicks.. I
then poured in the cocaine I had into both V-shaped cuts." Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1389.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 934 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991). cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1065 (1992).
210. 920 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1990).
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distribution of the drug. The defendants in Chan Yu-Chong were sen-
tenced based on the total weight of an unidentifiable substance com-
bined with heroin.211 There was no evidence that the unidentified sub-
stance was not consumable, 2 12 thus the defendants were sentenced based
on the combined amount of the "mixture." 2 13 In Robins, the Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that, although the cornmeal was consumable it should
not be included in the weight of the controlled substances for sentencing
purposes because "the sole purpose of the cocaine was to mask the iden-
tity of the cornmeal." 214
III. 1993 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
On April 29, 1993, the United States Sentencing Commission, after
observing the overwhelming dissimilarity in sentencing handed down by
the courts of appeal, finally promulgated amendments to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.2 15 The purpose of these amendments was to
make the sentencing scheme more rational.2 16 This section will focus on
and examine the main amendment which will effect the "mixture or sub-
stance" definition problem as suggested by the Sentencing Commission.
Because there has been much conflict over the way the circuit courts
have interpreted the phrase "mixture or substance," the proposed
amendments to section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines were de-
signed to resolve this conflict and, as Congress intended, add to uni-
formity and proportionality in sentencing.2 17 It appears that the Com-
211. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1390. The court distinguished Beltran-FelbV, a case factu-
ally similar to Innie, by holding that a mixture under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 does not mean a
readily marketable mixture. Id. (quoting Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d at 1076).
212. Chan Yu-Chon, 920 F.2d at 597.
213. Id. at 596.
214. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1390. The court reasoned that "the cornmeal was not used
to facilitate distribution of the one-tenth of a gram of cocaine. The cornmeal was used to
trick a purchaser into buying cornmeal thinking it was cocaine." Id. at 1391.
215. 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148 (1993) (codified at U.S.S.G. App. C, no. 484) (enacted
November 1, 1993).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 27,155. Application note one of§ 2D1.I was amended to read as follows:
'Mixture or substance' as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in
21 U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does not in-
clude materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the
controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials include the fiber-
glass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax
statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled
[Vol 12
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mission has adopted the approach of the "lenient" courts in this amend-
ment, by including the phrase "'mixture or substance' does not include
materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before
the controlled substance can be used." 218
Congress amended section 2D 1.1 in an attempt to resolve two main
issues that have been encountered by the federal circuits. The first issue
that this amendment attempts to resolve is what portion of the drug
mixture should be included in the sentencing determination. 219 After the
enactment of this amendment, the weight of a carrier medium, which
can neither be ingested along with the controlled substance it is carrying
nor facilitate the marketability of the controlled substance, is not to be
included when determining the weight of the drug for sentencing pur-
poses.220 The second issue is whether or not liquid waste produced dur-
ing the manufacturing of a controlled substance should be included.22 1
This amendment makes it clear that the weight of such waste and the
chemicals used for processing the drugs are not to be included. 222
Even though the amendment was created to clarify the interpretation
problem regarding "mixture or substance," the question still arises as to
what effect, if any, the amendment will have on future cases involving
this issue. The language used in the amendment may still be interpreted
in an ambiguous manner by the courts and may continue to lead to dis-
parate sentencing between the circuits. Although the amendment's lan-
guage is unambiguous, except for the examples stated, it is not clear
from the amendment exactly what materials "must be separated" from
the controlled substances. This leaves open the question regarding situa-
substance. If such material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or sub-
stance that appropriately is counted in the Drug Quantity Table, the court may
use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance
to be counted.
An upward departure nonetheless may be warranted when the miture or
substance counted in the Drug Quantity Table is combined with other. non-






221. Id. This seems to clearly address the problems the courts have had regarding
methamphetamine production. Compare United States v. Baker. 883 F.2d 13. 15 (Sth
Cir.) (holding that waste water be included for sentencing purposes), cert. dented. 493
U.S. 983 (1989) with United States v. Jennings. 945 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that it would be irrational to include the weight of the waste water).
222. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. comment. (n.1).
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tions involving controlled substances mixed with materials such as
creme liqueur, as was the case in United States v. Acosta.2
23
Another potential problem is with the phrase "if such material cannot
readily be separated from the mixture or substance... tile court may use
any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or sub-
stance" to be included. 224 This last provision might lead the courts to
reach contrary results when deciding what can or cannot be readily sepa-
rated. Based on the already existing views of the individual circuits, it is
hard to imagine that the courts will be able to reach a uniform conclu-
sion as to what materials "can be readily separated," without some form
of clarification.
Even if the courts can come to common understanding of what mate-
rials "can be readily separated," there is yet another problem. The
amendment expresses that courts would still have discretion as to what
"reasonable method" they employ in determining the weight to be used
to calculate the base offense level. 225 As it has been in the past, it is pos-
sible that people convicted of the same offense, in different circuits, will
receive disparate sentences because each circuit will have its own
"method" in determining what weight is to be used.
The 1993 amendments will also provide the circuit courts of appeals
with many opportunities to re-examine the issue of whether or not to
include a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of a
controlled substance" for sentencing purposes. This is no more apparent
than in the recent Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Richards.226 In
Richards, the defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 227 He relied on the amended commentary to
the guidelines which excludes waste water from the definition of
"mixture or substance" for purposes of weighing methamphetamine. 228
The district court granted the defendant's motion and reduced his sen-
tence from 188 months to 60 months.229 The Government, in its appeal,
conceded that the amended commentary is applicable to the defendant
but argued that the "Sentencing Commission's decision to exclude waste
223. 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992).
224. 58 Fed. Reg. at 27,155 (1993).
225. Id.
226. 1995 WL 596840 (10th Cir. Oct. 11, 1995).
227. Id. at * 1.
228. Id. See supra note 220.
229. Richards, 1995 WL 596840 at * 1. The defendant pled guilty to possession with
intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. He possessed 28 grams of pure metham-
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water from 'mixture or substance' does not alter the definition of that
phrase in the statutory context." 230 The government based its argument
"on the notion that [the] amended commentary to the sentencing guide-
lines cannot change the established judicial interpretation of a stat-
ute."231 The Tenth Circuit agreed with this assertion and stated that the
"amended commentary cannot alter any prior, independent construction
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) [that has been] made," 232 but said that it was ir-
relevant because, in their words, "we disagree that we have definitively
construed the statute itself to include waste water in its definition of
'mixture or substance."' 233
The court looked to the holdings in Callihan and Dorrough and de-
termined that the Tenth Circuit had construed "mixture or substance" in
section 2Dl.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines "without any reference or
citation to the statute or its construction, merely relying on the Sentenc-
ing Commission's admonition that 'if any mixture or compound con-
tains any detectable amount of a controlled substance, the entire amount
of the mixture or compound shall be considered in measuring the quan-
tity.' 234
The court then re-examined the holding of the district court, which
had reduced the defendant's sentence to sixty months, in an effort to
determine whether the amendments had any effect on the interpretation
of the sentencing practices of the Tenth Circuit. 235 The court stated that
"[t]he Sentencing Commission specifically addressed the current issue in
its amended commentary to § 2D1.1, clearly excluding the weight of
waste water from the measurement of a 'mixture or substance.'" 236
The court also noted that the Sentencing Commission specifically
stated its intent to have these amendments resolve the inter-circuit con-
flict when it expressed to Congress its reasons for amending the com-
mentary.237 The court, in affirming the decision of the district court,
concluded by stating:
230. Id.
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id. at *3.
233. Id. at *2. The government conceded that the court has interpreted -mixture or
substance" only in the context of § 2D1.I of the Sentcncing Guidelines, but they argued
that because "mixture or substance" as used in § 2Dl.1 has the same meaning as in 21
U.S.C. § 841, the court has implicitly settled the statutory issue as well. Id. at 63.
234. Id. (citing United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462, 1463 (10th Cir. 1990)).
235. Id. at "5.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *5. See 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148, 27,155 (1993) (codified at U.S.S.G. App.C.
no. 484) (enacted November 1, 1993).
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[W]e are free to interpret the statute as an issue of first impression. [This
court] is not required to interpret a statute in accordance with an outdated
guideline and in conflict with the current, applicable guideline. We thus
construe 'mixture or substance' in [21 U.S.C.] § 841 to be consistent
with the guideline commentary as revised. 238
Thus, it appears that the 1993 amendments caused the Tenth Circuit to
shift from its "strict" interpretation of a "mixture or substance," to join
"the majority of [its] sister circuits in adopting Congress' market-
oriented approach to drug sentencing as articulated in Chapman."239
It is still too early to see what long-term effects the 1993 amendments
to the Guidelines will have on future cases, but if the Richards case is
any indication, the Sentencing Commission has not fulfilled its goal to
have these amendments resolve the inter-circuit conflict.
CONCLUSION
Congress desires uniform and proportional sentencing for all defen-
dants convicted under the Sentencing Guidelines and 21 U.S.C. § 841,
but has failed to give the courts any guidance in how to apply the term
"mixture or substance." The Supreme Court's decision in Chapman has
done little to help settle the current split among the federal circuits.
Some courts have applied a literal meaning to the term "mixture or sub-
stance" which closely follows the Chapman decision, while others have
shifted away from the literal interpretation of the statutory language and
have followed a more lenient approach in order to exclude the weights
of non-marketable or uningestable mixtures when making sentencing
determinations.
The problem with 21 U.S.C. § 841 and section 2D1lI of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines goes far beyond the "mixture or substance" interpreta-
tion, because the definition, by itself, fails to give the courts the neces-
sary guidance when they need to decide what should be included in the
sentencing determination. The 1993 amendments may prove to be help-
ful, but the Supreme Court, Congress and the Sentencing Commission
are on notice that the split within the circuits must be resolved as soon as
possible if the goals of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing are
to be achieved.
EricJ. Stockel*
238. Richards, 1995 WL 596840 at *6.
239. Id.
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